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PUBLIC RESTROOMS AND THE DISTORTING 
OF TRANSGENDER IDENTITY* 
TERRY S. KOGAN** 
The sex-separated public restroom, a ubiquitous feature of our built 
environment, has been at the vortex of litigation filed by state 
officials across the country challenging the Obama administration’s 
attempt to assure that transgender people have access to safe 
restrooms. Tracing the ongoing federal litigation in North Carolina 
surrounding the passage of House Bill 2, this Article argues that 
this seemingly mundane architectural space has in fact driven the 
litigation strategies of all parties to these cases. In insisting that 
access to public restrooms be based on biological sex, state officials 
rely on an outmoded nineteenth century cultural vision of women 
as weak and vulnerable, and therefore in need of a separate 
restroom to protect them from predatory men in the public realm. 
In contrast, in a bold attempt to protect transgender people, the 
Obama administration took for granted that public restrooms 
should be sex-separated. The administration insisted, however, that 
individuals be permitted to access the men’s or the women’s facility 
based on their gender identities. In so doing, the federal government 
ignored that gender identity is not binary and, accordingly, that 
there are individuals for whom there is no safe, accessible restroom 
in public places. This Article concludes by proposing that sex-
segregated public restrooms be replaced by all-gender, multi-user 
facilities that protect the privacy and safety concerns of all patrons, 
while discriminating against no one. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A morality play is now unfolding in federal district court in North 
Carolina arising from the enactment of North Carolina’s Public Facilities 
Privacy and Security Act (“H.B. 2”) in March 2016.1 H.B. 2 provided in 
pertinent part: “Local boards of education shall require every multiple 
occupancy bathroom or changing facility that is designated for student 
 
 1. Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act (H.B. 2), secs. 1.2–.3, §§	115C-521.2, 142-760, 
2016-2 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1 (LexisNexis), repealed by An Act to Reset S.L. 2016-3 (H.B. 
142), 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws __. On March 28, 2016, three transgender plaintiffs, Equality North 
Carolina, and the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) filed an action in the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina against then-Governor Patrick 
McCrory, the University of North Carolina, then-Attorney General Roy Cooper, as well as 
the president pro tempore of the state senate and the speaker of the state house of 
representatives, alleging that H.B. 2 discriminated against the plaintiffs in violation of Title IX 
of the Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”) and the equal protection and due process 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 
43–44, Carcaño v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (No. 1:16-CV-00236) 
[hereinafter Carcaño Complaint].  
  On May 9, 2016, the United States filed a separate action against the State, the 
Governor, the Department of Public Safety, and the University of North Carolina challenging 
H.B. 2 as prohibited sex discrimination under Title IX, the Violence Against Women 
Reauthorization Act of 2013, and Title VII. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 1–2, 
United States v. State, No. 1:16-cv-00425 (M.D.N.C. May 9, 2016) [hereinafter Obama DOJ 
Complaint]. 
  On that same day, state officials filed two separate actions. In the first, Governor 
McCrory and Secretary Perry of the North Carolina Department of Public Safety sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking declarations, inter alia, that H.B. 2 did not violate 
federal law. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 1, McCrory v. United States, No. 5:16-cv-
00238-BO (E.D.N.C. May 9, 2016) [hereinafter McCrory Complaint]. In the second, Phil 
Berger, the president pro tempore of the state senate, and Tim Moore, the speaker of the 
state house of representatives, similarly sought a declaration, inter alia, that H.B. 2 did not 
violate federal law. Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 1–2, Berger v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
No. 5:16-cv-00240-FL (E.D.N.C. May 9, 2016) [hereinafter Berger Complaint]. Throughout 
this Article, the various North Carolina officials who litigated in the federal court action will 
be referred to as the “State plaintiffs.” 
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use to be designated for and used only by students based on their 
biological sex.”2 
This courtroom drama pits two powerful opponents against one 
another. On one side are transgender plaintiffs and their supporters—
the U.S. Department of Justice under the Obama administration (the 
“Obama DOJ”) and civil rights groups.3 On the other side are various 
state officials, including the former governor, the former secretary of the 
Department of Public Safety, and leaders of both chambers of the North 
Carolina General Assembly (collectively, “State plaintiffs”).4 The 
 
 2. Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act (H.B. 2), sec. 1.2, §	115C-521.2(b), 2016-2 
N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 2. On March 23, 2016, the North Carolina General Assembly 
enacted the “Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act.” Id. The law defined “Biological Sex” 
as “[t]he physical condition of being male or female, which is stated on a person’s birth 
certificate.” Id. sec. 1.2, §	115C-521.2(a)(1). H.B. 2 was enacted to overturn an ordinance 
adopted by the Charlotte City Council that, inter alia, effectively allowed transgender people 
to use public restrooms in accord with their gender identity. Charlotte, N.C., Ordinance 7056-
X (Feb. 22, 2016); see Steve Harrison & Jim Morrill, After LGBT Vote, NC House Speaker 
Says Lawmakers Will “Correct This Radical Course”, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Feb. 23, 2016, 
9:59 AM), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/article61932507.html 
[http://perma.cc/NG8D-APRD]. 
 3. See supra note 1. The arguments in this Article rely solely on the pro-lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgender (“LGBT”) policy positions taken by the Obama DOJ and the 
Department of Education (“ED”) that form the basis of their complaint in this litigation, and 
not on subsequent statements of the Trump administration. 
  The Obama DOJ expressed its policy position in the Dear Colleague Letter on 
Transgender Students, jointly issued by the DOJ and the ED on May 13, 2016, and directed to 
public schools receiving federal funding. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Opinion 
Letter on Transgender Students (May 13, 2016) [hereinafter Opinion Letter on Transgender 
Students], https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-title-ix-transgender
.pdf [https://perma.cc/AG3W-T9QK]. That document required that, for purposes of Title IX, 
“[w]hen a school provides sex-segregated activities and facilities, transgender students must 
be allowed to participate in such activities and access such facilities consistent with their 
gender identity.” Id. at 3. That position undergirds the DOJ’s complaint filed in the North 
Carolina federal litigation discussed herein. 
  On February 22, 2017, the Trump administration’s Department of Justice (the 
“Trump DOJ”) and ED issued a letter withdrawing the Dear Colleague Letter on 
Transgender Students. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Opinion Letter on 
Withdrawal of Title IX Guidance Documents 1–2 (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa
/press-release/file/941551/download [https://perma.cc/WAD3-RRR2]. That document states in 
pertinent part: “[T]he [ED] and the [DOJ] have decided to withdraw and rescind [the Dear 
Colleague Letter] in order to further and more completely consider the legal issues involved. 
The Departments thus will not rely on the views expressed within [the Dear Colleague 
Letter].” Id. at 1; see Sandhya Somashekhar, Emma Brown & Moriah Balingit, Trump 
Administration Rolls Back Protections for Transgender Students, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/trump-administration-rolls-back-protections-
for-transgender-students/2017/02/22/550a83b4-f913-11e6-bf01-d47f8cf9b643_story.html?utm
_term=.1895f49e273c [https://perma.cc/G8QU-4MA8]. 
 4. After successfully moving to intervene in both Carcaño v. McCrory and United States 
v. State, the Berger plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims in their original suit. See 
Carcaño v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615, 628–29 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (discussing procedural 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1205 (2017) 
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backdrop is a commonplace setting: two adjacent public restrooms, one 
labeled Men’s and one labeled Women’s. 
This Article argues that this seemingly mundane backdrop is, in 
fact, the protagonist of the drama. The architectural space of the sex-
separated restroom is an unchanging, unchallenged constant at the heart 
of the controversy. In a subtle yet undeniable way, the configuration of 
this space and its cultural history have controlled the litigation strategies 
of all parties. In the Obama DOJ’s bold attempt to protect the rights of 
transgender people, the sex-separated restroom forced the federal 
government to distort the nature of transgender identity by ignoring the 
existence of transpeople5 and others who do not self-identify as male or 
female, and thus cannot be readily assigned to one or the other 
restroom.6 In contrast, in attempting to protect the “privacy and 
dignity”7 of North Carolina citizens and the “bodily privacy rights”8 of 
state employees, the State plaintiffs relied not only on the binary 
separation of public restrooms but also on the nineteenth century 
cultural history that cloaks this space to craft a melodrama with 
transwomen as the predatory and psychologically disturbed villains at 
the center of the tale.9 For both sides in the litigation, the existing 
architectural configuration of the public restroom combined with its 
social history overdetermine the meanings of human bodies and the 
identities associated with those bodies.10 
 
history). In September 2016, former Governor McCrory dropped his lawsuit against the DOJ 
in the Eastern District of North Carolina, citing “the substantial costs to the state” and “the 
interests of judicial economy.” Plaintiff’s Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice at 
3, McCrory v. United States, No. 5:16-cv-00238-BO (E.D.N.C. Sept. 16, 2016). 
 5. See infra text accompanying note 74. Throughout this Article, transgender individuals 
will occasionally be referred to as “transpeople.” 
 6. See discussion infra at note 74; see also infra Section II.A. 
 7. Berger Complaint, supra note 1, ¶	2. 
 8. McCrory Complaint, supra note 1, ¶	1. 
 9. See discussion infra at note 104; see also infra Section II.C. 
 10. Most discussions of the “bathroom problem,” have focused on bodies and human 
psychology. See, e.g., ROBYN LONGHURST, BODIES: EXPLORING FLUID BOUNDARIES 66 
(2001) (“Toilets/bathrooms are often used as spaces in which bodily boundaries are broken 
and then made solid again.”); Kath Browne, Genderism and the Bathroom Problem: 
(Re)materialising Sexed Sites, (Re)creating Sexed Bodies, 11 GENDER, PLACE & CULTURE 
331, 332–33 (2004) (“Toilets, as sites that are separated by the presumed biological distinction 
between men and women and their different excretionary functions, can be sites where 
individuals’ bodies are continually policed and (re)placed within sexed categories.”). 
Commentators have often addressed this issue from the perspective of queer theory, which 
aims “to demonstrate that gender and sexual categories are not given but constructed.” 
JENNIFER MARCHBANK & GAYLE LETHERBY, INTRODUCTION TO GENDER: SOCIAL 
SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 257 (2007). For a major work which applies queer theory to facilitate 
an understanding of public restrooms, see SHEILA L. CAVANAGH, QUEERING BATHROOMS: 
GENDER, SEXUALITY, AND THE HYGIENIC IMAGINATION 5 (2010) (“This book endeavours 
to theorize how and why the public washroom is a site for gender-based hostility, anxiety, 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1205 (2017) 
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This Article draws from cultural geographers11 and critical 
architectural theorists,12 who decry the tendency of many scholars to 
assume that the spaces in which interactions between people take place 
are but inert stages on which the real human drama unfolds. In the 
North Carolina litigation, no one has dared to suggest that the true 
villain undermining the rights of transgender people might be the 
existing binary configuration of the ubiquitous sex-separated restroom. 
This Article focuses on the North Carolina federal court litigation, 
in part because the pleadings so powerfully illustrate the profound 
impact that the built environment has on litigation strategies in lawsuits 
involving public restrooms. Similar litigation over the impact of Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”) on the rights of 
transgender students in relation to restroom use is also pending in other 
 
fear, desire, and unease in the present day as the washroom is also a site of homoerotic 
desire.”). This Article focuses instead on the configuration of architectural space and the ways 
in which such space can determine and convey cultural understandings about sex, gender, and 
sexuality. 
 11. See, e.g., THE ROUTLEDGE RESEARCH COMPANION TO GEOGRAPHIES OF SEX AND 
SEXUALITIES back cover (Gavin Brown & Kath Browne eds., 2016) (“[T]his state-of-the-art 
review both charts and develops the rich sub-discipline geographies of sexualities, exploring 
sex-gender, sexuality and sexual practices.	.	.	.	Developing thinking in this area, geographers 
and other social scientists have illustrated the centrality of place, space and other spatial 
relationships in reconstituting sexual practices, representations, desires, as well as sexed 
bodies and lives.”) Cultural geographer Michael Landzelius has noted: 
[T]he question of sexing, sexualizing, and gendering space is not simply about those 
sexed, sexualized, and gendered practices/performances that take place in a particular 
space, but just as much about those practices in political, legislative, and planning 
bodies, architectural offices, etc., etc., that through the imposition of various kinds of 
norms and regulations constitute that space in a particular fashion. 
Michael Landzelius, Gender—Part I, in THE WILEY-BLACKWELL COMPANION TO HUMAN 
GEOGRAPHY 486, 495 (John Agnew & James S. Duncan eds., 2011). 
 12. See, e.g., LESLIE KANES WEISMAN, DISCRIMINATION BY DESIGN: A FEMINIST 
CRITIQUE OF THE MAN-MADE ENVIRONMENT 2 (1992) (“Space, like language, is socially 
constructed; and like the syntax of language, the spatial arrangements of our buildings and 
communities reflect and reinforce the nature of gender, race, and class relations in society. 
The uses of both language and space contribute to the power of some groups over others and 
the maintenance of human inequality.”); see also AARON BETSKY, BUILDING SEX: MEN, 
WOMEN, ARCHITECTURE, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY xvii (1995) 
(“[A]rchitecture in its broadest sense is how we construct our sexualities in the real world and 
thus define ourselves in a given place and time.”); AARON BETSKY, QUEER SPACE: 
ARCHITECTURE AND SAME-SEX DESIRE 5 (1997) (“In this book, I will try to describe what I 
mean by [queer space]. It is a kind of space that I find liberating, and that I think might help 
us avoid some of the imprisoning characteristics of the modern city. It is a useless, amoral, and 
sensual space that lives only in and for experience.”); Joel Sanders, Introduction to STUD: 
ARCHITECTURES OF MASCULINITY 11, 12 (Joel Sanders ed., 1996) (“Stud invites both 
theorists and architects, writers and artists, to expand the notion of cultural construction by 
investigating the active role that architectural constructions play in the making of gender.”). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1205 (2017) 
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courts, most notably in G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County School 
Board.13 In March 2017, as a result of the Trump administration’s DOJ 
and ED withdrawing previously issued guidance establishing protections 
for transgender students, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of 
the lower court and remanded the case.14 In addition, in May 2016, the 
State of Texas joined with eight other states and various state officials in 
filing an action against the United States in a Texas federal district court 
challenging the Obama DOJ and ED’s interpretation of Title VII and 
Title IX to require that restroom access in public schools be based on 
 
 13. 822 F.3d 709, 715 (4th Cir.), cert. granted in part, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016) (mem.), and 
vacated and remanded 2017 WL 855755 (U.S. 2017); see Robert Barnes & Moriah Balingit, 
Supreme Court Takes Up School Bathroom Rules for Transgender Students, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-takes-
up-school-bathroom-rules-for-transgender-students/2016/10/28/0eece4ea-917f-11e6-a6a3- 
d50061aa9fae_story.html [https://perma.cc/7EVV-7UUA].  
  In amicus briefs filed in the Supreme Court on behalf of the defendants, conservative 
groups, in addition to arguing federal overreaching, see, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae 
Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty in Support of Petitioner at 7–10, Gloucester Cty. Sch. 
Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, __ S. Ct. __ (2017) (mem.) (No. 16-273), 2017 WL 855755, made a 
number of arguments that directly stigmatized transgender identity, see, e.g., Brief Amicus 
Curiae of Foundation for Moral Law in Support of Petitioner at 2, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. 
G.G. ex rel. Grimm, __ S. Ct. __ (2017) (mem.) (No. 16-273), 2017 WL 855755 (claiming that 
allowing Gavin Grimm to succeed “will encourage more young people to question their 
gender identity, likely causing confusion, trauma, turmoil and other unfortunate 
consequences”); Brief of Christian Educators Ass’n International et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioner at 17, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, __ S. Ct. __ (2017) 
(mem.) (No. 16-273), 2017 WL 855755 (adopting the Obama DOJ’s interpretation of Title IX 
and its regulations “imposes immorality into schools by promoting conduct (selecting a 
‘gender identity’) contrary to biological and Biblical teachings”); Brief of Amicus Curiae of 
Alliance Defending Freedom in Support of Petitioner at 14, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. 
ex rel. Grimm, __ S. Ct. __ (2017) (mem.) (No. 16-273), 2017 WL 855755 (“Because the fluid 
continuum of gender identity is divorced from the real physical differences between boys and 
girls, when the transgender students demand access to opposite sex facilities, they have no 
basis to advance a bodily privacy claim.”). 
  In March 2017, the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit and remanded the case “for further consideration in 
light of the guidance document issued by the Department of Education and Department of 
Justice on February 22, 2017.” Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., __ S. Ct. at __, 2017 WL 855755, at *1; 
see supra note 3. 
 14. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, __ S. Ct. __ (2017) (mem.), 2017 WL 
855755, at *1 (vacating and remanding the Fourth Circuit decision “for further consideration 
in light of the guidance document issued by the Department of Education and Department of 
Justice on February 22, 2017”); see Letter from Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Hon. Scott S. Harris, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court (Feb. 22, 2017), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/16-273-2.22.17-DOJ-Cover-Letter-
Guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RBZ-336N]; see supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also 
Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Won’t Hear Major Case on Transgender Rights, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/us/politics/supreme-court-transgender-
rights-case.html [https://perma.cc/5QEM-98GU]. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1205 (2017) 
2017] GENDER & PUBLIC RESTROOMS 1211 
gender identity and not biological sex.15 Following the Trump DOJ and 
ED’s change of position with respect to transgender students and public 
restrooms, the plaintiff States voluntarily dismissed the action without 
prejudice on March 3, 2017.16 
On March 29, 2017, Governor Roy Cooper and the North Carolina 
General Assembly reached a compromise to repeal H.B. 2 by enacting a 
new bill, H.B. 142, into law.17 H.B. 142 repealed H.B. 2, but effectively 
left H.B. 2’s state preemption on regulation of bathroom accessibility in 
place, and imposed a moratorium on the adoption of new local 
nondiscrimination ordinances through 2020.18 Following the enactment 
of H.B. 142, the Trump DOJ and the state officials jointly stipulated to 
dismiss all claims and counterclaims brought in the Obama DOJ’s 
original action.19 Because many in the LGBT community were unhappy 
with the terms of the compromise, the ACLU and other litigants have 
signaled plans to continue litigating this issue and amend their original 
complaint to challenge the newly enacted H.B. 142.20 
Part I explores the architectural and cultural history of the sex-
separated restroom in the United States, a history that began with the 
factory water closet in the late nineteenth century and the first state laws 
regulating that space. Part II presents a brief introduction to 
 
 15. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2–3, Texas v. United States, 201 F. 
Supp. 3d 810 (No. 7:16-cv-00054-O) (N.D. Tex. 2016), ECF No. 1. The district court granted 
the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the Obama DOJ and ED from 
taking any further action pursuant to this interpretation. Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 
3d 810, 815 (N.D. Tex. 2016), order clarified by Order, No. 7:16-cv-00054-O, 2016 WL 7852331 
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2016), appeal docketed, No. 16-11534 (5th Cir. Oct. 20, 2016). In the North 
Carolina litigation, the district court declined to follow this ruling, relying on the Fourth 
Circuit’s holding in the Grimm case. Carcaño v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615, 635 (M.D.N.C. 
2016). 
 16. Plaintiffs’ Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i), 
Texas v. United States, No. 7:16-cv-00054-O (N.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2017), ECF No. 128. The 
plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the action after the United States dismissed its appeal of the 
district court’s preliminary injunction before the Fifth Circuit. Unopposed Motion for 
Voluntary Dismissal at 1–2, Texas v. United States, No. 1611534 (5th Cir. Mar. 2, 2017). 
 17. An Act to Reset S.L. 2016-3 (H.B. 142), 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws __, __; see Matthew 
Burns & Laura Leslie, HB2 Repealed, But Many Unhappy with “Reset”, WRAL (Mar. 30, 
2016, 10:05 PM), http://www.wral.com/hb2-repealed-but-many-unhappy-with-reset-/16615133/ 
[https://perma.cc/7RWP-Z9K2]. 
 18. An Act to Reset S.L. 2016-3 (H.B. 142), 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws at __; see Will Doran, 
What Changes (and What Doesn’t) in HB2 Replacement Bill, NEWS & OBSERVER (Mar. 28, 
2017, 6:38 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/politics-columns-
blogs/under-the-dome/article141821679.html [https://perma.cc/P5W6-CHCP]. 
 19. Joint Stipulated Notice of Dismissal at 1, United States v. State, No. 1:16-cv-00425-
TDS-JEP (M.D.N.C. Apr. 14, 2017), ECF No. 245. 
 20. Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU and LAMBDA Condemn ‘Fake’ 
Repeal of HB2 (March 30, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-and-lambda-legal-condemn-
fake-repeal-hb-2 [https://perma.cc/PA65-CC7L]. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1205 (2017) 
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contemporary understandings of transgender identity. It then examines 
how the existing binary layout of the public restroom and the cultural 
understandings surrounding that space forced the parties to the North 
Carolina litigation to distort transgender identity. Part III then looks to 
scholars who have had the temerity to imagine alternative ways to 
configure public restrooms that do not divide that space on the basis of 
sex, but rather in ways that support the needs of everyone for safe, 
accessible restrooms when they enter the public realm. 
I.  LAW, CULTURE, AND THE PUBLIC RESTROOM 
To appreciate the central role that the sex-separated public 
restroom has played in the ongoing North Carolina litigation, one must 
answer two questions about the history of that space. First, what led to 
separating public restrooms by sex in the first place? Second, what 
cultural understandings surrounding that space have been inherited 
from late nineteenth century understandings about women, men, their 
bodies, and their relationships? 
A. The History of Sex Separation of Public Restrooms in the United 
States 
In a sense, public restrooms in the United States have always been 
separated by sex. Early in our country’s history, restrooms were all 
single-user water closets, privies, or outhouses, which effectively kept 
two people (of the same or opposite sex) from using that space at the 
same time.21 Despite the State plaintiffs’ assertion that the sex-separated 
restroom “has been an accepted part of our Nation’s social compact 
since time out of mind,”22 in fact, the multi-user public restroom—at the 
vortex of the North Carolina litigation—dates back only to the 1870s 
when public works technology had advanced to a point that enabled 
effluence to be transported from buildings through municipal sewer 
systems.23 
The first laws in the United States mandating that public restrooms 
be separated by sex, enacted in the late nineteenth century, were 
 
 21. See Terry S. Kogan, Sex-Separation in Public Restrooms: Law, Architecture, and 
Gender, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 38 (2007) [hereinafter Kogan, Sex-Separation]; see also 
Maya Rhodan, Why Do We Have Men’s and Women’s Bathrooms Anyway?, TIME (May 16, 
2016), http://time.com/4337761/history-sex-segregated-bathrooms/ [https://perma.cc/Z7MM-
QFKJ]. 
 22. Berger Complaint, supra note 1, ¶	9, at 4. 
 23. See Kogan, Sex-Separation, supra note 21, at 35–39; see also Wendy C. Perdue, 
Lawrence O. Gostin & Lesley A. Stone, Public Health and the Built Environment: Historical, 
Empirical, and Theoretical Foundations for an Expanded Role, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 557, 
558 (2003). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1205 (2017) 
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directed at factories and other workplaces where men and women 
worked side-by-side.24 In previous work, I have explored the origins of 
these laws and will only briefly recount that history.25 Factory toilet laws 
can be traced back to the early nineteenth century when, as a result of 
the industrial revolution, men left the home to work in factories and 
women remained behind, rearing children and tending hearth fires.26 
There arose in America a “separate spheres” ideology—the notion that 
the public realm was the proper place for men and the private home the 
proper place for women.27 
This sentimental vision of the virtuous and vulnerable woman 
remaining in her domestic haven was a cultural myth that bore little 
resemblance to the evolving realities of the nineteenth century. From 
the outset of the century, the demands of a burgeoning economy forced 
women from the privacy of the home into the workplace and American 
civic life.28 Nonetheless, American culture clung tenaciously to the 
separate spheres ideology, and any move by a woman outside of the 
home was viewed with suspicion and anxiety.29 As a result, by mid-
 
 24. Terry S. Kogan, Sex-Separation: The Cure-All for Victorian Social Anxiety, in TOILET: 
PUBLIC RESTROOMS AND THE POLITICS OF SHARING 145 (Harvey Molotch & Laura Norén, 
eds., 2010) [hereinafter Kogan, Cure-All]. In Victorian America great anxiety surrounded the 
fact and men and women worked together in factories. See, e.g., id. There was widespread 
acceptance among sanitation professionals that factory restrooms should be separated by sex. 
See, e.g., GEORGE M. PRICE, THE MODERN FACTORY: SAFETY, SANITATION AND WELFARE 
277 (1914) [hereinafter PRICE, THE MODERN FACTORY] (“All industrial and sanitary codes 
demands [sic] separate water-closet compartments for the sexes in every factory where men 
and women are employed.”). 
 25. See generally Kogan, Sex-Separation, supra note 21 (exploring the legal, historical, 
and cultural influences surrounding the development of sex-separated restrooms); Kogan, 
Cure-All, supra note 24 (exploring the institution of sex-separated bathrooms in the United 
States during the late nineteenth century); Terry S. Kogan, How Did Public Bathrooms Get to 
Be Separated by Sex in the First Place?, CONVERSATION (May 26, 2016, 10:03 PM), https://
theconversation.com/how-did-public-bathrooms-get-to-be-separated-by-sex-in-the-first-place-
59575 [https://perma.cc/D8MA-N7LF] [hereinafter Kogan, CONVERSATION] (discussing the 
development of sex-separated restrooms in the United States). 
 26. See, e.g., DAVID E. SHI, FACING FACTS: REALISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT AND 
CULTURE 1850–1920, at 17 (1995) (“As the more complex economy of the nineteenth century 
matured, economic production was increasingly separated from the home, and the absence of 
men who left to work long hours in the city transformed the middle-class home into a 
‘separate sphere’ governed by mothers.”). 
 27. See id. at 17; Kogan, Sex-Separation, supra note 21, at 20. See generally Linda K. 
Kerber, Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, Woman’s Place: The Rhetoric of Women’s History, 
75 J. AM. HIST. 9 (1988) (describing the “separate spheres” ideology and analyzing its 
application to the study of women’s history in the United States). 
 28. See Arianne Renan Barzilay, Women at Work: Towards an Inclusive Narrative of the 
Rise of the Regulatory State, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 169, 175 (2008); Kogan, 
CONVERSATION, supra note 25. 
 29. Kerber, supra note 27, at 28–30; Kogan, CONVERSATION, supra note 25. 
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century, legislators began enacting protective labor legislation aimed at 
protecting the vulnerable, weaker bodies of women workers.30 
In their quest to protect women, regulators also set their sights on 
manipulating other public spaces besides the factory. Specifically, they 
cordoned off areas in a variety of venues for the exclusive use of women. 
For example, a separate ladies’ reading room became an accepted part 
of American public library design.31 American railroads began 
designating a “ladies’ car” for the exclusive use of women and their male 
escorts.32 By the end of the nineteenth century, women-only parlor 
spaces had been created in photography studios, hotels, banks, and 
department stores.33 
 It was in the spirit of manipulating public space to protect weak and 
vulnerable women that legislators enacted the first laws mandating that 
factory restrooms be separated by sex.34 The first such law was enacted 
in Massachusetts in 1887.35 By 1920, forty-three states had adopted 
 
 30. See Kogan, Sex-Separation, supra note 21, at 11–16. Examples included laws that 
limited women’s work hours, laws that required a rest period for women during the work day 
or seats at their work stations, and laws that prohibited women from taking certain jobs and 
assignments considered dangerous. See Barzilay, supra note 28, at 180–81; Kogan, Sex-
Separation, supra note 21, at 13–16. 
 31. Kogan, Sex-Separation, supra note 21, at 30; Abigail A. Van Slyck, The Lady and the 
Library Loafer: Gender and Public Space in Victorian America, 31 WINTERTHUR PORTFOLIO 
221, 227–30 (1996). 
 32. Richard H. Chused, Courts and Temperance Ladies, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 339, 
367 (2010); Kogan, Sex-Separation, supra note 21, at 31. 
 33. Kogan, Sex-Separation, supra note 21, at 33; Van Slyck, supra note 31, at 223. 
 34. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Terry S. Kogan in Support of Respondent 
at 11–15, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, __ S. Ct. __ (2017) (mem.) (No. 16-
273), 2017 WL 855755. Factory toilets laws were often adopted as extensions to existing 
protective labor legislation aimed at women and children. See, e.g., Act of May 25, 1887, ch. 
462, §	13, 1887 N.Y. Laws 575, 577 (“An act to regulate the employment of women and 
children in manufacturing establishments	.	.	.	.”). 
 35. Act of Mar. 24, 1887, ch. 103, §	2, 1887 Mass. Acts 668, 669; see Kogan, Sex-
Separation, supra note 21, at 15. Entitled “An Act to Secure Proper Sanitary Provisions in 
Factories and Workshops,” the Massachusetts statute stated in pertinent part: 
[W]herever male and female persons are employed in the same factory or workshop, 
a sufficient number of separate and distinct water-closets, earth-closets or privies shall 
be provided for the use of each sex and shall be plainly designated, and no person 
shall be allowed to use any such closet or privy assigned to persons of the other sex. 
§	2, 1887 Mass. Acts at 669. The first law in North Carolina related to sex separation of toilets 
was enacted in 1913 and reflects cultural values related not only to sex, but also to race: 
That all persons and corporations employing males and females in any manufacturing 
industry, or other business employing more than two males and females	.	.	.	shall 
provide and keep in a cleanly condition separate and distinct toilet rooms for such 
employees, said toilets to be lettered and marked in a distinct manner, so as to 
separate the white and colored males and females of both sexes. 
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similar legislation.36 Any suggestion that such legislation was adopted for 
gender-neutral reasons is belied not only by the legislative titles,37 but 
also by the very language of such laws.38 As I have previously argued, the 
enactment of factory toilet laws was a last-ditch attempt by Victorian 
legislators to bolster the moribund separate spheres ideology and 
recapture the lost world of the early nineteenth century.39 
B. The Turn of the Century Cultural Understandings of Sex-
Separated Restrooms 
Sex-separated restrooms are ubiquitous in contemporary society. 
That architectural space remains, however, cloaked in an ideology 
inherited from the late nineteenth century, a vision that influences how 
our society views the very identities of women and men when they enter 
the public realm.40 
 
Act of Mar. 8, 1913, ch. 83, §	1, 1913 N.C. Sess. Laws, 127, 127. 
 36. George Martin Kober, History of Industrial Hygiene and Its Effect on Public Health, 
in A HALF CENTURY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 361, 377 (Mazÿck P. Ravenel ed., 1921); see, e.g., 
supra note 35; infra notes 37–38. 
 37. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 6, 1891, 1891 Ohio Laws. 87, 87 (“An act for the preservation of 
the health of female employes [sic]”); see also Act of Jan. 27, 1897, ch. 98, Tenn. Pub. Acts 
247, 247 (“AN ACT to require employers of females to provide separate water-closets for 
them.”). 
 38. See, e.g., Act of May 29, 1901, No. 206, §	10, 1901 Pa. Laws 322, 323–24 (“A suitable 
and proper wash and dressing room and water closets shall be provided for males and 
females, where employed	.	.	.	and the water closets used by females shall not adjoin those used 
by males, but shall be built entirely away from them, shall be properly screened and 
ventilated, and at all time kept in a clean condition.”). 
 39. See Kogan, Sex-Separation, supra note 21, at 55. 
 40. The late nineteenth century cultural understanding of public restrooms was carried 
forward to the present day through model building codes, first adopted in the 1920s. See, e.g., 
PAC. COAST BLDG. OFFICIALS CONFERENCE, THE PACIFIC COAST UNIFORM BUILDING 
CODE: ITS HISTORY AND PURPOSES & THE PACIFIC BUILDING OFFICIALS CONFERENCE 4 
(1929). The ostensible purpose of these codes was to assure health and safety in all aspects of 
building construction. For example, a set of “Questions and Answers” that accompanied the 
first edition of the Pacific Coast Building Officials Conference’s 1929 Uniform Building Code 
answers the question “What is its purpose?” with the following:  
The purpose of the Uniform Code is: first, to furnish in one book the fundamental 
requirements necessary to enable the city building official to provide building 
regulations in accordance with modern building methods so that he may adequately 
insure public health, safety and welfare; and second, to provide uniformity insofar as 
fundamental are concerned. 
Id. 
  These codes were formulated by regional industry groups with the goal that 
municipalities would enact a model code in its entirety, thereby assuring uniformity of 
building practices in a particular region. See, e.g., AM. INST. ARCHITECTS, AN ARCHITECT’S 
GUIDE TO BUILDING CODES & STANDARDS 13 (3d ed. 1991) (“The three model code 
organizations	.	.	.	were initially established to enable building officials and their respective 
jurisdictions to seek solutions to common problems and to satisfy common needs on a 
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Two sources cast significant light on how late nineteenth century 
culture viewed sex-separated restrooms. First, the factory toilet laws 
themselves offer insights into this issue.41 The second fertile source of 
such insights are reports prepared by sanitation experts42 and by state 
 
regional basis.”). For purposes of this Article, what is critical is that the first model codes, on 
their surface directed to technical concerns of safe building construction, contained provisions 
requiring that public restrooms be separated by sex. See INT’L CONF. OF BUILDING 
OFFICIALS, UNIFORM BUILDING CODE §	1305, at 46 (1927). In particular, the “Requirement 
for Group H Buildings,” (including hotels, apartment houses, dormitories, lodging houses, 
convents, monasteries, and old people’s homes) stated in pertinent part: 
Every building shall be provided with at least one toilet. Every building and each 
subdivision thereof where both sexes are accommodated shall be provided with at 
least two toilets located in such building and one toilet shall be conspicuously marked 
“For Women” and the other conspicuously marked “For Men.” Not less than one 
toilet shall be provided for each fifteen (15) persons or major fraction thereof that 
such building is designed to accommodate. 
Id. §§	1301, 1305, at 45–46. Every subsequent revision of the Uniform Building Code to the 
present day contained a similar requirement that public restrooms in new construction be sex-
separated. See, e.g., INT’L CONFERENCE OF BLDG. OFFICIALS, UNIF. BUILDING CODE 
§	1305(c) (1964) (“Sanitation. Every building shall be provided with at least one toilet. Every 
hotel and each subdivision thereof where both sexes are accommodated shall be provided 
with at least two toilets located in such building, which shall be conspicuously marked, one for 
each sex.”). The International Building Code, the successor to the Uniform Building Code, 
provides: “Where plumbing fixture are required, separate facilities shall be provided for each 
sex.” INT’L CODE COUNCIL, INTERNATIONAL BUILDING CODE §	2902.2 (2015). 
 41. Any suggestion that factory toilet laws were adopted for gender-neutral reasons 
related to biology is belied by the titles given to many of these laws, which make explicit their 
paternalistic goals. For example, the 1911 Ohio factory restroom law purported to amend 
sections of the Ohio General Code “relating to the preservation of the health of female 
employes [sic].” Act of May 31, 1911, sec. 1, §	1009, 1911 Ohio Laws 488, 488. Similarly, a 1919 
North Dakota law related to factory toilets was titled “An Act to Protect the Lives and 
Health and Morals of Women and Minor Workers.” Act of Mar. 6, 1919, ch. 174, 1919 N.D. 
Laws 317, 317. Other examples can be found in South Dakota and Tennessee legislation. See 
Act of Mar. 3, 1913, ch. 240, 1913 S.D. Sess. Laws 332, 332 (“An Act to Regulate the 
Employment of Women and Girls and Children Within This State”); Act of Jan. 22, 1897, ch. 
98, 1897 Tenn. Pub. Acts 247, 247 (“An Act to require employers of females to provide 
separate water-closets for them”). 
 42. See, e.g., C. F. W. DOEHRING, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BULL. NO. 44, FACTORY 
SANITATION AND LABOR PROTECTION 1–2 (1903); see also J. J. COSGROVE, FACTORY 
SANITATION vii (1913) (“The necessity for modern sanitation in the factory does not rest 
entirely upon the value of sanitation for hygienic reasons, but is made imperative by the fact 
that money is saved, production cheapened, cost of maintenance lessened, better employees 
secured, and their efficiencies enhanced, by the proper number and distribution of sanitary 
appliances.”); GEORGE M. PRICE, JOINT BD. OF SANITARY CONTROL IN THE DRESS & 
WAIST INDUS., SPECIAL REPORT ON SANITARY CONDITIONS IN THE SHOPS OF THE DRESS 
AND WAIST INDUSTRY 3 (1913) [hereinafter PRICE, SPECIAL REPORT]; PRICE, THE MODERN 
FACTORY, supra note 24, at v (“An attempt is made in this book to give a 
comprehensive	.	.	.	review of the safety and sanitary conditions of factories and 
workshops	.	.	.	and to indicate the methods of safety sanitation, efficiency and welfare of 
factories and workshops as they should be.”). 
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and federal factory inspectors,43 all of whom paid special attention to the 
sanitary conditions facing women and children workers early in the 
twentieth century.44 
The North Carolina litigation has focused on multi-user restrooms 
and the purported threat posed by allowing transpeople to use such 
spaces based on their gender identities. But as noted above, prior to the 
1870s multi-user restrooms did not exist in the United States due to the 
lack of public works technology.45 Modern plumbing came late to the 
workplace, where the single-user indoor water closet or privy, or 
outdoor outhouse remained the norm until well into the twentieth 
century.46 Accordingly, the first factory toilet laws mandating sex-
separation applied to single-user water closets, privies, and outhouses.47 
For example, an 1889 California law required that 
[w]henever the persons employed . . . are of different sexes, a 
sufficient number of separate and distinct water-closets or privies 
 
 43. See, e.g., DEP’T OF COMMERCE & LABOR, I REPORT ON CONDITION OF WOMAN 
AND CHILD WAGE-EARNERS IN THE UNITED STATES IN 19 VOLUMES, S. DOC. NO. 61-645, 
at 9–10 (1910) [hereinafter CONDITION OF WOMAN AND CHILD WAGE-EARNERS REPORT]; 
see also Kogan, Sex-Separation, supra note 21, at 37–39 (discussing an investigation of factory 
sanitation in New York). For example, in 1907, Congress passed “An Act To authorize the 
Secretary of Commerce and Labor to investigate and report upon the industrial, social, moral, 
educational, and physical condition of woman and child workers in the United States.” Act of 
Jan. 29, 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-41, 34 Stat. 866, 866. As a result, in 1910, the Department of 
Commerce and Labor issued an extended study entitled “Report on Condition of Woman and 
Child Wage-Earners in the United States in 19 Volumes.” See, e.g., I CONDITION OF WOMAN 
AND CHILD WAGE-EARNERS REPORT, supra, at 9–10. 
 44. See generally, e.g., I–XIX CONDITION OF WOMAN AND CHILD WAGE-EARNERS 
REPORT, supra note 43 (documenting the working conditions for women and children within 
nineteen different industries). 
 45. See supra text accompanying note 21. 
 46. In his 1914 examination of factory sanitation, The Modern Factory, George Price 
noted the following in a section entitled “Toilet Accommodations”: 
No part of an industrial establishment is so neglected as the toilet accommodations. In 
many cases they are located outside of the factory, and sometimes quite a distance 
from it, causing the loss of much time and also endangering the health of the 
employes [sic]. In the investigation made for the New York State Factory 
Commission, the toilets were located in yards in 186 of the establishments 
inspected.	.	.	.	Many of the toilets were not separated for the sexes and were of an 
obsolete and crude type. 
PRICE, THE MODERN FACTORY, supra note 24, at 275. 
 47. See id. at 282–83. Price describes a privy in the following manner: 
In its primitive and common form the privy-vault is nothing but a hole dug in the 
ground near or at some distance from the house; the hole is but a few feet deep, with 
a plank or rough seat over it, and an improvised shed over that.	.	.	.	The principal parts 
of a privy are: the shed, the seat, and the receptacle into which the excreta is dropped. 
Id. at 282. 
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shall be provided for the use of each sex, which shall be plainly so 
designated and no person shall be allowed to use any water-closet 
or privy assigned to persons of the other sex.48 
The requirement that these spaces be “separate and distinct” 
referred not only to providing separate compartments for men and 
women, but also requiring that these spaces be located apart from one 
another in the factory.49 Where men’s and women’s water closets could 
not be physically separated, statutes required that these spaces be 
properly screened so that the interior could not be observed by those in 
the adjoining workroom.50 
Why would states require that single-user restrooms not only be 
separated by sex, but also be located physically apart from one another 
in the factory and have their entrances screened? What harm could 
possibly come from men and women using the same single-user water 
closet, privy, or outhouse? 
These requirements reveal late nineteenth century understandings 
and concerns about female workers, male workers, their bodies, and 
their relationships. Men used factory water closets for the sole purpose 
of relieving themselves. In contrast, women needed separate spaces in 
the workplace—water closets, resting rooms, and dressing rooms—as a 
result of their inherent weaknesses51 and their special vulnerabilities 
 
 48. Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. V, §	1, 1889 Cal. Stat. 3, 3. 
 49. See, e.g., Act of June 3, 1893, No. 244, §	10, 1893 Pa. Laws, 276, 278 (“A suitable and 
proper wash and dressing room and water closets shall be provided for females where 
employed, and the water closets used by females shall not adjoin those used by males, but 
shall be built entirely away from them and shall be properly screened	.	.	.	.”). Factory inspector 
George Price insisted that adequate partitions between men’s and women’s restrooms were 
not enough: “It is best that toilet rooms for males and females should be in different parts of 
the building.” PRICE, THE MODERN FACTORY, supra note 24, at 277. 
 50. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 8, 1913, ch. 83, §	4, 1913 N.C. Sess. Laws. 127, 128 (“[I]n those 
[water closets] now erected, all closets shall be separated by substantial walls of brick or 
timber	.	.	.	.”); see also Act of Apr. 6, 1894, ch. 524, §	1, 1894 Md. Laws 772, 772 (requiring that 
the two restrooms in public schools have a “separate means of access for each, and unless 
placed at a remote distance, one from another, the approaches or walks thereto shall be 
separated by a substantial close fence not less than seven feet high.”); infra note 53 
(documenting lack of adequate barriers and screens separating water closets). 
 51. See, e.g., DOEHRING, supra note 42, at 1–2. A Department of Labor report from 1903 
characterized women in the following way: 
Under the influence of long-continued work under insanitary conditions the 
physiques of the workmen, and especially those employed in factories, often show 
more or less characteristic marks. The height is usually below medium, the body, 
weak and thin, is poorly nourished and of sickly paleness.	.	.	.	The spiritual and moral 
life may likewise become inactive and apathetic.	.	.	.	Women suffer even more than 
men from the stress of such circumstances, and more readily degenerate. A woman’s 
body is unable to withstand strains, fatigues, and privations as well as a man’s. 
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(including increased susceptibility to dizziness, fainting, and hysteria).52 
These were spaces to which women could retreat when their weak 
bodies were overcome by the physical and emotional stresses of the 
workplace. 
The requirement that the water closets be “separate and distinct” 
and that there be “privacy of approach” responded to the deep-seated 
concern of Victorian modesty that women not be viewed by men with 
regard to any aspect of toilet use. First and foremost was the concern 
that a woman not be seen while using a toilet,53 or in any state of undress 
for that matter.54 The requirement that water closet entrances be 
screened helped to protect against this breach of privacy.55 At the same 
time, concerns of modesty were reciprocal and extended to the 
impropriety of women viewing factory men in any state of undress.56 
 
Id. One book from 1901 compiling the opinions of health experts affirmed these beliefs: 
Where the two sexes are as far as possible equally exposed to the influence of lead, 
women probably suffer more rapidly, certainly more severely, than men. To a certain 
extent the reason is to be found in the fact that lead exercises an injurious influence 
upon the reproductive functions of women. It deranges menstruation. 
Id. at 28 (quoting Thomas Oliver, Lead and Its Compounds, in DANGEROUS TRADES: THE 
HISTORICAL, SOCIAL, AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF INDUSTRIAL OCCUPATIONS AS AFFECTING 
HEALTH, BY A NUMBER OF EXPERTS 282, 301 (Thomas Oliver ed., 1902)). 
 52. See, e.g., PRICE, SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 13. (“In the shops where there 
are a large number of girls working, it is probable that there are a number likely to have 
sudden attacks of dizziness, fainting or other symptoms of illness, for whose use provision 
should be made in the form of rest or emergency rooms.”). See generally CARROLL SMITH-
ROSENBERG, DISORDERLY CONDUCT 197–216 (1985) (discussing hysteria as a condition 
considered to be unique to women in nineteenth century culture). 
 53. See, e.g., I CONDITION OF WOMAN AND CHILD WAGE-EARNERS REPORT, supra 
note 43, at 371 (“Cotton Textile Industry” report). The inspector noted: 
In a very large proportion of the mills there is not reasonable privacy of approach to 
the water-closets. In some cases the water closets for females immediately adjoin 
those for males. In some mills	.	.	.	closets are built within the workrooms, and the thin 
board partitions do not extend to the ceiling, and in some instances the doors do not 
reason to the floors. Where this is the case the feet and lower parts of the skirts of 
females occupying the water-closets can be seen from the workrooms. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 54. See, e.g., III id. at 344 (“Glass Industry” report). One factory inspector recounted: 
“Women employed in	.	.	.	factories [with inadequate facilities] had for washing purposes at 
best only the common factory hydrants, and such dressing as they could decently do had to be 
done in the publicity of rooms in which men were employed or to which men had frequent 
access.” Id. 
 55. See, e.g., XI id. at 26 (“Metal Trades” report) (“The sharpest criticism which can be 
directed against these provisions is the neglect of proper privacy. In a few cases it was possible 
to see the interior from a point in the shop.”). 
 56. See, e.g., XII id. at 12 (“Employment of Women in Laundries” report). The inspector 
noted: 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1205 (2017) 
1220 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
But the requirement that men’s and women’s water closets be 
located apart from one another in the factory responded to a concern 
that women not even be observed by men when they were entering a 
toilet room.57 In addition, locating men’s water closets apart from 
women’s water closets assured that men not experience the sounds and 
smells produced by a woman while using a facility—yet another breach 
of Victorian modesty.58 
The anxiety over separate toilets was symbolic of a broader anxiety 
over men and women even working together in the same space, 
concerns linked to Victorian morality. One factory inspector noted: 
 
In one instance the one closet of the establishment was in the basement under the 
pavement, with no light except what came from a circular piece of glass set in the 
pavement and no ventilation but the open door.	.	.	.	It was in plain sight of the men 
who were doing the washing in the basement, clad only in their undergarments. 
Id. 
 57. See, e.g., III id. at 353 (“Glass Industry” report). The report noted: 
The subject of privacy of closets is, indeed, one to which very few manufacturers have 
given any thought or, at least, active attention.	.	.	.	Often one or two large working 
rooms represent a whole floor of the building. In such case, there being no other 
available space on the floor, the closets are often simply walled-off portions of the 
workroom, the men’s and women’s closets side by side and the entrances exposed to 
the direct view of all. 
Id.; see also I id. at 373 (“Cotton Textile Industry” report). The inspector reported: 
In the second and third stories there is a screen in front of the doors to the closets. 
The wooden partition between the closets extends out beyond the main wall about 2 
feet to meet the screen. These little approaches can be seen from any point in each 
story, and on the first floor there is no screen at all. The approaches are absolutely 
devoid of privacy. 
Id. Similarly, in the silk industry report, the inspector notes: “As a rule there is not sufficient 
privacy of approach. In most cases the toilets for males adjoin those for females.” IV id. at 182 
(“The Silk Industry” report). 
 58. See, e.g., COSGROVE, supra note 42, at ix. In a caption beneath a photograph of two 
adjacent, extremely filthy water closets labeled “Men” and “Females” located in the corner of 
a workroom, Cosgrove notes: 
Moral decency requires that where males and females are employed, separate 
accommodations shall be provided which, in every sense of the word, will be private. 
Ignoring the obvious filth of this double accommodation for “men” and “females,” 
close proximity of the fixtures separated only by a thin board partition, far from 
sound proof, and the common approach, such accommodations would be morally 
objectionable even if they were sanitary, clean, well lighted and well ventilated. 
Id.; see also I CONDITION OF WOMAN AND CHILD WAGE-EARNERS REPORT, supra note 43, 
at 373 (“Cotton Textile Industry” report) (“On each floor one water-closet for men and one 
for women were found. They are separated by a board partition, not impervious to light and 
certainly not to sound, since there is an opening near the top of the partition.”).  
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In cotton mills large numbers of men, women, and children are 
brought together in the same workrooms. Where men and women 
are thus constantly associated it is, of course, possible for immoral 
relations between them to spring up. . . . In many 
mills . . . there is no privacy of approach to the toilets, and 
anyone entering them does so in full view of persons of both sexes 
in the same workroom, a condition obviously not in the interest of 
good morals.59 
To late nineteenth century regulators, providing separate water closets 
was directly related to upholding social morality. 
In providing vulnerable women and girls with a separate restroom 
space, regulators sought to protect them from the perceived threat posed 
by men and boys working in factories, who were portrayed as leering 
and predatory, ever seeking to observe women in any state of undress, 
excited not only by viewing a woman’s legs under a toilet stall, but also 
by even watching a woman enter a water closet.60 In effect, factory toilet 
laws reflect this prevailing view of male factory workers as vulgar and 
obscene.61 
The sex-segregated public restroom, first mandated by laws in the 
late nineteenth century, has become a pervasive architectural feature of 
contemporary America. Yet that space continues to convey cultural 
messages first evoked by factory laws in the late nineteenth century. 
Perhaps most importantly, this architectural feature continues to 
reinforce the cultural understanding that the sex of human bodies is 
inherently binary—every person is either male or female.62 There is no 
better evidence of this than the ubiquitous men’s and women’s signs on 
the doors of public restrooms. 
 
 59. See I id. at 590. 
 60. See, e.g., III id. at 455 (“Glass Industry” report). In the 1903 Department of Labor 
report, the inspector interviewed managers about their women employees: 
One superintendent expressed the opinion that [a glass factory] is no fit place for a 
woman to work. He said that he has, in his experience, discharged more men for 
offering insults to women than for any other cause.	.	.	.	An establishment rule 
prohibits the men lounging in or about the women’s workrooms during the noon 
hour	.	.	.	. 
Id. 
 61. See, e.g., Act of May 18, 1892, ch. 673, §	9, 1892 N.Y. Laws 1372, 1376 (requiring that 
water closets must “be kept free of obscene writing and marking”). 
 62. See, e.g., Browne, supra note 10, at 338 (“The physical sexed segregation of 
bathrooms reproduces the illusion of a natural, biological binary separation of sex and 
physically (re)places bodies within dichotomous sexes ordering these sites.”). 
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II.  PUBLIC RESTROOMS AND THE RIGHTS OF TRANSGENDER 
PEOPLE 
One of the core questions raised in the North Carolina litigation is 
the meaning that is to be accorded to the term “sex” for purposes of 
Title VII63 and Title IX64 and its implementing regulations.65 In its 
complaint, the Obama DOJ asserted that sex equates to gender identity 
and, accordingly, that transgender persons be permitted to access public 
restroom in accord with that identity.66 In contrast, in line with H.B. 2, 
the State plaintiffs argued that sex equates to biology and, accordingly, 
that such access should be based on a person’s “current anatomy.”67 
In crafting their opposing litigation strategies, all parties to the 
litigation in North Carolina federal court accepted the existing 
architectural configuration of the sex-separated public restroom as a 
given. The major difference between the parties’ approaches to this 
space was that, in endeavoring to protect transgender rights, the Obama 
DOJ consciously ignored the century-old cultural understandings 
surrounding the sex-separated restroom that viewed women as weak and 
vulnerable, and men as inherently predatory.68 In great contrast, the 
 
 63. 42 U.S.C. §	2000e-2 (2012). 
 64. Education Amendments of 1972 §	901, 20 U.S.C. §	1681 (2012). 
 65. 28 C.F.R. §§	54.500, 54.535 (2016); 34 C.F.R. §§	106.32–.34, 106.41(b) (2016). The 
Obama DOJ similarly alleged that H.B. 2 violated the Violence Against Women 
Reauthorization Act of 2013, 42 U.S.C. §	13925(b)(13), by engaging in discrimination on the 
basis of sex and gender identity in programs receiving federal funds, Obama DOJ Complaint, 
supra note 1, ¶	2, at 1–2. In addition to alleging similar claims under Title VII and Title IX, 
Carcaño Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶	180–93, at 41–43, the transgender plaintiffs and civil 
rights groups have also claimed that H.B. 2 violated the constitutional rights of transpeople 
under the equal protection clause and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
id. ¶¶	132–79, at 33–41. This Article solely focuses on the statutory claims under Title VII and 
Title IX. 
 66. Obama DOJ Complaint, supra note 1, ¶	28, at 6–7. 
 67. Berger Complaint, supra note 1, ¶	5, at 3. 
 68. The Obama DOJ did accept certain of the nineteenth century understandings of the 
sex-separated restroom concerning the need for privacy. In his Memorandum Opinion 
granting a preliminary injunction to the transgender plaintiffs, the federal district court judge 
stated: 
Plaintiffs acknowledge, as Defendants contend, that such segregation promotes 
privacy and serves important government interests, particularly with regard to minors. 
Arguably, segregating such facilities on the basis of sex fills gaps not addressed by the 
peeping and indecent exposure statutes—for example, a situation in which a man 
might inadvertently expose himself to another while using a facility that is not 
partitioned. It is also possible that sex-segregated facilities protect against 
embarrassment from engaging in intimate bodily functions in the immediate vicinity 
of the opposite sex, regardless of whether one’s body is subject to view. 
Carcaño v. McCrory, 201 F. Supp. 3d 615, 623 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (order granting a preliminary 
injunction). 
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State plaintiffs fully embraced those understandings to construct an 
elaborate Victorian melodrama, one in which the evil villain is 
“Transwoman”—actually a man posing as a woman—who seeks to enter 
the ladies’ restroom with the nefarious goal of attacking weak and 
vulnerable women and girls. The hero of the drama is the North 
Carolina General Assembly, brandishing H.B. 2, who appears at the last 
minute to foil the wicked plot of Transwoman and his co-conspirator, 
the Obama DOJ.69 
This Article seeks to explore how, in their acceptance of the sex-
separated restroom as an unchallenged fact, the parties were unaware of 
the role that this architectural space has played and continues to play in 
the very cultural construction of bodies, genders, and sexualities.70 In 
particular, accepting the conventional division of public restrooms into 
men’s and women’s led the parties to distort transgender identity, albeit 
in very different ways.71 To explore these issues, this Article focuses on 
the complaints filed in federal court in North Carolina.72 
All parties to the litigation were faced with a fundamental 
challenge. When the cultural understandings surrounding the sex-
segregated public restroom developed at the end of the nineteenth 
century, transgender individuals were not part of the public narrative.73 
Accordingly, conventional understandings about public restrooms 
inherited from that era are devoid of any awareness of transpeople. In 
particular, the rigid division of human sex into the binary “male” and 
 
 69. See infra Section II.C.  
 70. Cultural geographer Robyn Longhurst notes: 
[T]here is no one body; the body is an illusion. There are only bodies in the plural. 
There are complex processes through which female and male bodies are 
differentiated. Bodies are sexed and gendered. The multiplicity that surrounds and 
inhabits the body, or bodies, makes it impossible to settle on any one straightforward 
definition. The body—whether it be infant, child or adult—is a surface of social and 
cultural inscription; it houses subjectivity; it is a site of pleasure and pain; it is public 
and private; it has a permeable boundary that is crossed by fluids; it is material, 
discursive and psychical. 
Robyn Longhurst, The Body, in CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY: A CRITICAL DICTIONARY OF 
KEY CONCEPTS 91, 91 (David Atkinson et al. eds., 2007). 
 71. Others have explored how public restrooms effectively make outlaws of gender non-
conforming people, including transgender individuals, whose self-identities and public 
expressions of those identities do not fit neatly into the categories male and female. See, e.g., 
Browne, supra note 10, at 338, 343. 
 72. See discussion supra note 1. 
 73. SUSAN STRYKER, TRANSGENDER HISTORY 34 (2008). Susan Stryker traces the roots 
of the modern transgender rights movement to the mid-nineteenth century, but points out 
that “the distinctions between what we now call ‘transgender’ and ‘gay’ or ‘lesbian’ were not 
always as meaningful back then as they have since become.” Id. 
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“female” categories cannot begin to account for the diversity of 
transgender identity. 
A. Transgender Identity Is Not Binary in Nature 
Transgender identity is not binary. Early understandings did adopt 
such a view, considering a transperson as either “a man trapped in a 
woman’s body” or a “woman trapped in a man’s body” and often 
referring to such individuals as “transsexuals” who suffered from a 
mental illness, “gender identity disorder.”74 The cure for this “disorder” 
was sex reassignment surgery, altering external genitals and/or internal 
gonads to match the individual’s sense of gender identity.75 
For roughly the past decade, psychologists and other scholars have 
begun paying closer attention to the narratives of transgender people, 
and have realized that the tapestry of trans-identity is far richer than 
merely binary.76 Many transgender individuals do self-identify with the 
sex opposite that of their birth bodies. Others do not self-identify as 
either male or female, but in some other way entirely.77 Moreover, the 
 
 74. See JOANNE MEYEROWITZ, HOW SEX CHANGED: A HISTORY OF TRANSSEXUALITY 
IN THE UNITED STATES 138–39 (2002) (stating that transsexuals “spoke of ‘a female trapped 
in a male’s body’	”). The term “gender identity disorder” was first coined in the American 
Psychological Association’s DSM-III in 1980. Peggy T. Cohen-Kettenis & Friedemann 
Pfäfflin, The DSM Diagnostic Criteria for Gender Identity Disorder in Adolescents and Adults, 
39 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 499, 499 (2009). 
 75. See STRYKER, supra note 73, at 91–98. 
 76. See, e.g., Lisa M. Diamond, Seth T. Pardo & Molly R. Butterworth, Transgender 
Experience and Identity, in 2 HANDBOOK OF IDENTITY THEORY AND RESEARCH 629 (Seth J. 
Schwartz et al. eds., 2011) (“[T]here is increasing evidence that	.	.	.	dichotomous models of 
gender fail to accommodate the true complexity and diversity of transgender experience.”). 
The authors explain: 
[T]he vast range of transgender-identified individuals who claim that they are “both” 
or “neither” male/female, or who adopt complex constellations of male/female 
identification and presentation, are not considered by the medical community to be 
appropriate candidates for sex reassignment. In fact, many such individuals do not 
seek complete sex reassignment at all, preferring instead to modify selected parts of 
their body (such as breasts or facial hair) or to forgo physical change altogether and 
focus on modifications in their social status and legal standing. This is consistent with 
the fact that such individuals typically reject the notion that they are simply “trapped 
in the wrong body” and hence do not view a wholesale substitution of one gender 
identification for the other as a personal goal or as a potential solution to any 
experiences of distress or discomfort they might face. It is this group of gender-fluid 
individuals that poses a fundamental dilemma to our attempts to develop broad-based 
models of transgender identity development. 
Id. at 632. 
 77. See, e.g., Katrina Roen, “Either/Or” and “Both/Neither”: Discursive Tensions in 
Transgender Politics, 27 SIGNS 501, 502 (2002) (“[S]ubversive crossing, public and politically 
strategic transgendering, is seen as one step on the road toward gender transgression, gender 
transcendence, and (ultimately) ridding the world of ‘gender oppression.’ For some, this 
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latest volume of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (“DSM”)78 replaces “Gender Identity Disorder” with a new 
psychological category, “Gender Dysphoria,” that applies only to those 
who experience suffering as a result of their gender disparity.79 In other 
words, trans-identity is, in and of itself, no longer a “disorder.”80 
Under the Obama administration, at least one federal agency 
embraced this contemporary understanding of trans-identity. In May 
2015, the Job Corps issued a directive entitled “Ensuring Equal Access 
for Transgender Applicants and Students to the Job Corps Program,” 
the purpose of which was to “ensure equal access and opportunity for 
transgender applicants and students in the Job Corps program.”81 The 
document sets forth a series of definitions, including the following: 
“Transgender” refers to people whose gender identity, expression, 
or behavior is different from that typically associated with their 
assigned sex at birth. Transgender is a broad term and an 
acceptable descriptive term for non-transgender people to 
use. . . . 
 
necessarily entails the disruption and eventual abandonment of categories such as ‘woman,’ 
‘man,’ and ‘transsexual.’	” (citation omitted)). 
 78. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS xli (5th ed. 2013); The DSM, published by the American Psychiatric Association, 
is the handbook used by health care professionals as the authoritative guide to the diagnosis 
of mental disorders. Now in its fifth edition, the DSM-V contains descriptions, symptoms, and 
other criteria for diagnosing mental disorders. See id. 
 79. Id. at 451; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, GENDER DYSPHORIA 2 (2013) [hereinafter AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, GENDER DYSPHORIA], https://psychiatry.org/File%20Library
/Psychiatrists/Practice/DSM/APA_DSM-5-Gender-Dysphoria.pdf [https://perma.cc/WN4F-
CFU8].  
 80. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, GENDER DYSPHORIA, supra note 79, at 2. With respect to 
the term “Gender Dysphoria” in the DSM-5, the American Psychiatric Association states: 
“Part of removing stigma is about choosing the right words. Replacing ‘disorder’ with 
‘dysphoria’ in the diagnostic label is not only more appropriate and consistent with familiar 
clinical sexology terminology, it also removes the connotation that the patient is 
‘disordered.’	” Id.  
 81. Memorandum from Lenita Jacobs-Simmons, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Directive: Job 
Corps Program Instruction Notice No. 14-31, Ensuring Equal Access for Transgender 
Applicants and Students to the Job Corps Program 1 (2015) [hereinafter Job Corps Directive] 
(“The Job Corps National Office, in consultation with the Civil Rights Center of the 
Department of Labor, has developed this guidance to ensure equal access and opportunity for 
transgender applicants and students in the Job Corps program.”). The Obama DOJ was 
clearly aware of this document. A DOJ and ED directive concerning transgender students in 
public schools relies on the Job Corps document to support the following statement: “[A] 
school must not treat a transgender student differently from the way it treats other students of 
the same gender identity. The Departments’ interpretation is consistent with courts’ and other 
agencies’ interpretations of Federal laws prohibiting sex discrimination.” Opinion Letter on 
Transgender Students, supra note 3, at 2. 
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“Gender identity” refers to an individual’s internal sense of being 
male, female, or something else. Since gender identity is internal, 
one’s gender identity is not necessarily visible to others.82 
Although the document also defines the terms “Transgender Man” 
and “Transgender Women,” the Job Corps’ definitions clearly embrace 
a view of gender identity (and, by extension, transgender identity) that is 
not limited to male and female; rather, this view allows for an 
individual’s self-understanding to move beyond the binary, as illustrated 
by the language “or something else.”83 In addition, in a section entitled 
“Housing, Restroom and Shower Access,” the directive states: 
The primary and overriding factor in assigning housing should be 
the student’s gender identity. . . . 
When a transgender student identifies as a particular gender, 
dormitory assignments should be based on that gender, regardless 
of whether the student has had any gender-related surgery, 
hormone therapy, or other medical procedures.  
 . . . For transgender students who do not identify as male or 
female, again, the housing preference of the student should be 
discussed and respected, whenever possible.84 
Unfortunately, the colossal presence of the sex-separated restroom 
looming over the North Carolina litigation left the Obama DOJ with 
little choice but to adopt a narrower, binary vision of trans-identity. Like 
everyone else, a transperson must be either male or female. 
B. The U.S. Department of Justice’s Vision of Restrooms and 
Transgender Identity Under the Obama Administration 
By any account, the Obama administration’s insistence that gender 
identity should be the primary criterion for determining who can use 
which public restroom was bold.85 The Obama DOJ’s refusal to pay 
homage to the social history and conventional norms surrounding the 
public restroom is strong evidence of its commitment to the rights of 
transpeople.86 Nonetheless, the Obama DOJ’s unquestioning acceptance 
 
 82. Job Corps Directive, supra note 81, at 1–2 (emphasis added). 
 83. Id. at 2. 
 84. Id. at 3–4 (emphasis added). 
 85. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 86. See supra Section I.A. Though accepting that, in general, people desire privacy in 
using restroom facilities, the Obama DOJ rejected the nineteenth century gendered vision 
that such privacy was necessary to protect women and girls from men. Loretta E. Lynch, Att’y 
General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at Press Conference Announcing Complaint Against 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1205 (2017) 
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of the longstanding architectural division of public restrooms into two, 
sex-separated spaces led it to distort current understandings of trans-
identity, thereby leaving groups of transpeople unprotected.87 
The North Carolina federal litigation was triggered by letters the 
Obama DOJ’s Civil Rights Division sent to former Governor Pat 
McCrory and other officials asserting that North Carolina’s H.B. 2 
violated Title VII,88 Title IX and its implementing regulations,89 and the 
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (“VAWA”).90 
One such letter stated: 
H.B. 2 . . . is facially discriminatory against transgender 
employees on the basis of sex because it treats transgender 
employees, whose gender identity does not match their “biological 
sex,” as defined by H.B. 2, differently from similarly situated non-
transgender employees. Under H.B. 2, non-transgender state 
employees may access restrooms and changing facilities that are 
consistent with their gender identity in public buildings, while 
transgender state employees may not.91 
The Obama DOJ’s unwavering support for transgender people was 
illustrated by its insistence that gender identity and not birth sex be the 
basis for determining who can access which public restroom. The 
Department seemingly disregarded the nineteenth-century cultural 
 
the State of North Carolina to Stop Discrimination Against Transgender Individuals (May 9, 
2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-loretta-e-lynch-delivers-remarks-
press-conference-announcing-complaint [https://perma.cc/4Z62-CYBW] (“This is why none of 
us can stand by when a state enters the business of legislating identity and insists that a person 
pretend to be something they are not, or invents a problem that doesn’t exist as a pretext for 
discrimination and harassment.”). Rather, in the joint guidance document issued in May 2016, 
the DOJ and ED recognized that any student might want added privacy: “A school may, 
however, make individual-user options available to all students who voluntarily seek 
additional privacy.” U.S. Dep’t of Educ. & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note at 3, at 3. In other 
words, rather than force only transgender students to use a private, single-user restroom, the 
DOJ took the position that private facilities should be provided to anyone who might so 
desire. 
 87. See infra text accompanying note 101. 
 88. 42 U.S.C. §§	2000e to 2000e-8 (2012). 
 89. 20 U.S.C. §	1681; e.g., 34 C.F.R. pt. 106 (2016). 
 90. 42 U.S.C. §	13925(b)(13); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Opinion Letter 
to Governor Pat McCrory 1 (May 4, 2016) [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Justice, McCrory 
Opinion Letter] (alleging violations of Title VII by Governor McCrory and state of North 
Carolina); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Opinion Letter on North Carolina 
House Bill 2 to Frank L. Perry, N.C. Sec’y of Pub. Safety, 1 (May 4, 2016) (alleging violations 
of Title VII and VAWA by the North Carolina Department of Public Safety); U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Civil Rights Division, Opinion Letter on North Carolina House Bill 2 to Margaret 
Spellings, President, Univ. of N.C., et al. 1 (May 4, 2016) (alleging violations of Title VII, Title 
IX, and VAWA by the University of North Carolina system). 
 91. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, McCrory Opinion Letter, supra note 90, at 2. 
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history surrounding that space that portrayed women as weak, 
vulnerable, and in need of protection from predatory, leering, and vulgar 
men.92 
The problem is that the Obama DOJ’s position literally runs up 
against a brick wall—the wall separating the men’s restroom from the 
women’s restroom. This ubiquitous architectural feature forced the DOJ 
to adopt a binary vision of transgender identity. For transpeople who do 
not identify as male or female, there is no restroom that is “consistent 
with their gender identity.”93 This distorting of trans-identity to comport 
with the built environment becomes clear in the DOJ’s complaint 
challenging H.B. 2’s mandate that all “[p]ublic agencies . . . require 
multiple occupancy bathrooms or changing facilities . . . be 
designated for and only used by individuals based on their biological 
sex.”94 The complaint relies heavily on Title IX, a statute that makes no 
reference to restrooms.95 However, the ED’s regulations adopted in 1980 
implementing Title IX state: “A recipient may provide separate toilet, 
locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex, but such facilities 
provided for students of one sex shall be comparable to such facilities 
provided for students of the other sex.”96 
In adopting this regulation, the ED was likely well aware of the role 
that public restrooms had played in defeating the Equal Rights 
Amendment (“ERA”).97 In light of the current federal court 
controversy, it is ironic that North Carolina Senator Sam Ervin invoked 
the specter of unisex restrooms to oppose the ERA in 1972. In 
congressional debate, after citing North Carolina’s law requiring 
“separate and distinct toilet rooms[,]”98 Senator Ervin stated: 
 
 92. See supra text accompanying note 60. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Obama DOJ Complaint, supra note 1, ¶	12, at 4; see id. ¶	2, at 1–2 (expanding the 
basis for the action to include not only Title VII, but also Title IX and the Violence Against 
Women Reauthorization Act). 
 95. See id. ¶¶	21, 55, at 5, 12 (respectively). Title IX provides in pertinent part: “No 
person	.	.	.	shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. §	1681(a) (2012). 
 96. 34 C.F.R. §	106.33 (2016) (originally adopted in 45 Fed. Reg. 30,955, 30,960 (May 9, 
1980)). 
 97. See H.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972); Amanda Terkel, Bathroom Panic 
Has Long Stood in the Way of Equal Rights, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 24, 2016, 2:45 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/bathroom-panic_us_56f40300e4b0c3ef521820e3 [https://
perma.cc/DX89-BYN3] (“	‘Operation Wake Up,’ a coalition of groups opposed to the ERA, 
also pushed the bathroom issue. An activist dressed up as a ‘common toilet’ and crossed out 
the words ‘his’ and ‘hers’ and wrote ‘theirs.’	”). 
 98. Act of Mar. 8, 1913, ch. 83, §	1, 1913 N.C. Sess. Laws. 127, 127. 
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The question raised by this amendment is what will be the effect 
of the Equal Rights amendments on laws which establish privacy 
of this nature and which require that the sexes be separated in 
restrooms. . . . 
It is clear as the noonday sun in a cloudless sky that the only 
reason that this Nation has separate restrooms for men and 
women and boys and girls . . . is sex. Consequently, being a 
distinction based on sex, the equal rights amendment would 
abolish the power of the Federal Government and the power of 
the 50 States to require separate facilities of this nature for 
persons of different sexes.99 
In adopting the separate toilets regulation implementing Title IX, the 
ED may well have sought to sidestep the very controversy that doomed 
the ERA less than a decade earlier. 
Nonetheless, the ED’s regulations accepting the propriety of 
separating restrooms by sex straitjacketed the Obama DOJ’s approach 
to the North Carolina litigation, which was aimed at protecting all 
transgender people. The 1980 regulation effectively left the DOJ with 
little choice but to construct trans-identity as binary, thereby ignoring 
the growing number of transpeople who self-identity in some other 
way.100 This is directly reflected in the DOJ’s complaint. In attacking 
H.B. 2, the department set forth its assertion that gender identity should 
be the primary factor in determining a person’s sex, not external 
genitals: 
An individual’s “sex” consists of multiple factors, which may not 
always be in alignment. Among those factors are hormones, 
external genitalia, internal reproductive organs, chromosomes, 
and gender identity, which is an individual’s internal sense of being 
male or female. For individuals who have aspects of their sex that 
are not in alignment, the person’s gender identity is the primary 
factor in terms of establishing that person’s sex. External genitalia 
are, therefore, but one component of sex and not always 
determinative of a person’s sex.101 
Despite the boldness of its position, like the ED, the Obama DOJ 
accepted that gender identity is binary, the “internal sense of being male 
or female.” The DOJ then aligned the definition of trans-identity with 
that understanding: “Transgender individuals are individuals who have a 
gender identity that does not match the sex they were assigned at birth. 
 
 99. 92 CONG. REC. 9529–30 (1972) (statement of Sen. Ervin). 
 100. See 34 C.F.R. §	106.33. 
 101. Obama DOJ Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶	31–32, at 7. (emphasis added). 
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A transgender man’s sex is male and a transgender woman’s sex is 
female.”102 
Locked in by the architectural fact of sex-separated restrooms, the 
Obama DOJ appears to have done its best to defend the rights of 
transgender people. But in the end, the existing binary configuration of 
that space and the public anxiety surrounding that space forced the DOJ 
to accept a narrow vision of transgender identity.103 Nonetheless, there is 
no hint in the DOJ’s complaint or in any other filing in the litigation that 
the architectural configuration of the sex-separated public restroom 
might be the true culprit responsible for denying civil rights to 
transgender people. 
C. The Defendant’s Vision of Restrooms and Identity—A Victorian 
Melodrama 
Like the Obama DOJ, the leaders of both chambers of the North 
Carolina General Assembly accept as a given the existing configuration 
of sex-separated public restrooms in their complaint.104 But in great 
contrast to the DOJ, in crafting their litigation position the State 
plaintiffs fully embraced the late nineteenth century cultural 
understandings of that space, understandings that developed long before 
our society gained any awareness of transgender people. 
In reliance on that cultural history, the State plaintiffs constructed a 
dramatic Victorian melodrama in which the transwoman plays the 
central role as the evil villain. In the weeks leading up to the lawsuit, 
North Carolina officials left no doubt that they adopted a late 
nineteenth century vision of public restrooms, one involving vulnerable 
women and predatory men. Senate President Pro Tempore Phil Berger 
described the legislature’s purpose in enacting H.B. 2 as “stop[ping] a 
radical . . . ordinance allowing men into public bathrooms and locker 
rooms with young girls and women.”105 He described the Charlotte 
ordinance overturned by H.B. 2 as “dangerous . . . creat[ing] a 
loophole that any man with nefarious motives could use to prey on 
women and young children.”106 
 
 102. Id. ¶	34, at 8. 
 103. This did not prove to be a problem for the ACLU in representing the transgender 
plaintiffs in the North Carolina litigation, as both plaintiffs self-identified as male. See ACLU 
Complaint, supra note 65, ¶	22, at 8 (“Mr. Carcaño is a man.”) and ¶	58, at 15 (“Mr. McGarry 
is a man.”). 
 104. The focus of this Section is the complaint filed in Berger. See Berger Complaint, supra 
note 1. 
 105. Obama DOJ Complaint, supra note 1, ¶	18, at 5. 
 106. Id. 
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Here is the outline of an imaginary plot for the Victorian 
melodrama embodied in the Berger Complaint: 
 For as long as anyone could remember, things were peaceful 
in the Village. (The “system of single-sex 
bathrooms . . . has been an accepted part of our Nation’s 
social compact since time out of mind.”107) In particular, 
people went about their daily lives, respecting one another’s 
“bodily privacy”108 by sharing “the intimate settings of public 
bathrooms, locker rooms, or showers . . . only [with] other 
people of the same biological sex.”109 In the Village there 
existed a special fortress, the Women’s Restroom, a protected 
space set aside for the exclusive use of weak and vulnerable 
women and girls. 
 One day a villain named Transwoman, a man dressed in 
women’s clothing, arrived in the Village. A deeply 
“conflicted”110 person, Transwoman suffered from the 
dreaded psychological illness, “gender dysphoria.”111 In part as 
a result of that illness and in part simply because he was a 
man, Transwoman was predatory to the core. His sole desire 
was to invade the Women’s Restroom to see women and girls 
in states of undress,112 and perhaps to perform other acts of 
untold evil on these vulnerable souls. 
 To accomplish this, Transwoman crafted an evil plot whereby, 
based “solely on [his] self-declared”113 and “false claims of 
gender identity,”114 he deceitfully asserted that he was a 
woman and therefore should be permitted to enter the 
Women’s Restroom.115 Transwoman’s plot would enable him 
as a “male sexual predator [to] falsely claim[] to ‘identify’ as 
 
 107. Berger Complaint, supra note 1, ¶	9, at 4. 
 108. Id. ¶	1, at 1. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. ¶	3, at 2 (“Apparently, the Department believes that these obvious social costs are 
outweighed by the policy’s purported psychological benefits to persons of conflicted gender 
identity.”). 
 111. Id. ¶	3, at 2. 
 112. According to the ACLU, in enacting H.B. 2 North Carolina “[l]awmakers made no 
attempt to cloak their actions in a veneer of neutrality, instead openly and virulently attacking 
transgender people, who were falsely portrayed as predatory and dangerous to others.” 
Carcaño Complaint, supra note 1, ¶	3, at 2. 
 113. Berger Complaint, supra note 1, ¶	3, at 2. 
 114. Id. ¶	88, at 29. 
 115. By failing to distinguish between transwomen and sexual predators, the State 
plaintiffs suggest that transwomen are deceitful by nature. See, e.g., id. ¶	62, at 18 (“Indeed, 
under the Department’s legal theory, a biological male found in a women’s restroom has a 
legal right to be there if he merely claims to ‘self-identify’ as female.”). 
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female so that he can enter a women’s bathroom and prey 
upon a little girl whom he has seen enter alone.”116 
 The Village people were outraged, fearing that Transwoman’s 
evil scheme would prohibit them from “exclud[ing] biological 
males from female bath and shower facilities,”117 and would 
inevitably lead to “partially or fully unclothed women and 
girls coming into close proximity and visual contact with 
individuals who . . . display male sex organs.”118 
 Coming to the aid of the damsels in distress, the heroic Town 
leaders unsheathed their shining weapon, H.B. 2, a statute 
aimed at protecting women and girls from an “assault on their 
dignity, privacy, and safety.”119 Specifically, H.B. 2 required 
that any “facility [such as the Village’s Women’s 
Restroom] . . . where persons may be in various states of 
undress in the presence of other persons”120 must be 
“designated for and only used by persons based on their 
biological sex.”121 
 The Town leaders explained that the goal of H.B. 2 was to 
show “concern and compassion for . . . girls and 
women . . . who do not wish to be in close proximity to 
persons with genitals characteristic of the opposite sex when 
using public restrooms, locker rooms, and showers.”122 
 Out of further compassion, the Town leaders included an 
“accommodation”123 in H.B. 2 that allowed Transwoman, 
based on the “special circumstance[]”1124 of his psychological 
illness, to enter a “single-occupancy bathroom” meant for 
townspeople with disabilities (if one happened to be 
 
 116. Id. ¶	88, at 29; see also id. ¶	62, at 17–18 (“Such a policy would also create an 
opportunity for sexual predators of any sexual orientation to abuse the policy to facilitate 
their predation. And in so doing, such a policy would violate settled, legitimate expectations 
of privacy and safety that have long prevailed in the State.”). 
 117. Id. ¶	64, at 18. 
 118. Id. ¶	61, at 17; see also id. ¶	3, at 2 (“Never mind that the Department’s policy will 
inevitably lead to women and girls in public changing facilities encountering individuals who, 
whatever their gender identity, still have fully functional male genitals.”). The reference to 
“functional” male genitals suggests that, so long as a transwoman has male genitals, “he” is a 
sexual threat to women and girls. 
 119. Id. ¶	5, at 3. 
 120. Id. ¶	24, at 8. 
 121. Id. ¶	22, at 8. 
 122. Id. ¶	5, at 3. 
 123. Id. ¶	28, at 9. 
 124. Id. ¶	27, at 8. 
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available).125 In addition, the Town leaders compassionately 
told Transwoman that if he merely removed his manhood 
through “a sex-change operation . . . then [he?/she? could] 
use the public facilities consistent with [his?/her?] new 
anatomy.”126 
 But evil Transwoman refused to sit idly by and allow the 
Town leaders to stifle his predatory desire to invade the 
Women’s Restroom. He engaged the assistance of a 
supervillain, the Obama DOJ, to stage an all-out 
“assault . . . on the sovereign right of [the town] to 
determine [its] own policies regarding public bath and shower 
facilities.”127 
 Joining in Transwoman’s rallying cry that all people “be 
permitted ‘to access bathrooms and other facilities consistent 
with their ‘gender identity,’	”128 the DOJ threatened to hold 
hostage “hundreds of millions of dollars,”129 that the town 
“citizens ha[d] already paid”130 to the DOJ’s boss. 
As this exercise makes clear, the State plaintiffs’ only concern was 
with inauthentic transwomen who, in their view, are actually men.131 
Transmen (arguably really women who are a threat to men when they 
enter the men’s restroom) are nowhere to be found in their complaint. 
In the late nineteenth century factory, no one was thinking about 
aggressive women seeking to assault men or boys, visually or otherwise. 
Accordingly, there is simply no cultural history related to women being 
a threat to men in public restrooms upon which the State plaintiffs could 
rely in crafting their lawsuit. 
In sum, by dismissing gender identity as of any relevance 
whatsoever to public restroom use, the State plaintiffs ignore a 
fundamental truth about transgender lives. Moreover, the suggestion 
that transwomen are a threat to women and girls in public restrooms is a 
red herring unsupported by evidence. In fact, all credible surveys reveal 
 
 125. Id. ¶	26, at 8. 
 126. Id. ¶	4, at 3. 
 127. Id. ¶	8, at 4. 
 128. Id. ¶	37, at 11. 
 129. Id. ¶	59, at 16. 
 130. Id. ¶	60, at 17 (“[T]he Department’s demands carry a threat to cut off over $100 
million in annual federal funding currently provided to the State’s Department of Public 
Safety. Here again, these are funds that North Carolina citizens have already paid into the 
federal treasury in the form of tax payments.”). 
 131. See, e.g., id. ¶	8, at 4 (“It is a remarkable act of executive overreach, one that 
unnecessarily insists on political correctness at the expense of privacy and safety for other 
vulnerable citizens, especially women and girls.”). 
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that transpeople are common victims of restroom violence, facing 
constant threats of verbal and physical assault in their attempt to find 
safe and accessible public restrooms.132 The remarks of Attorney 
General Loretta Lynch that accompanied the Obama DOJ’s filing of the 
North Carolina lawsuit make clear that the federal government was well 
aware of groundless accusations often directed against transpeople:  
[W]e have seen bill after bill in state after state taking aim at the 
LGBT community. Some of these responses reflect a recognizably 
human fear of the unknown, and a discomfort with the uncertainty 
of change. But this is not a time to act out of fear. This is a time to 
summon our national virtues of inclusivity, diversity, compassion 
and open-mindedness.133 
The conflict between the opposing sides to this litigation is a direct 
consequence of the fact that public restrooms are currently segregated 
by sex, which requires a society to determine criteria for who is entitled 
to access which of the two restrooms. Were this most important of public 
spaces to be configured in a non-binary way, the vitriolic opposition 
exhibited in the North Carolina litigation would simply collapse. 
III.  THE ALL-GENDER, MULTI-USER PUBLIC RESTROOM OF THE 
FUTURE 
Perhaps the time has come to reconsider how public restrooms 
should be architecturally configured and designated. Perhaps the time 
has come to consider the possibility of an all-gender, multi-user 
restroom, one in which no one will either feel or be made to feel out of 
place. Critical to such an endeavor is assuring that the concerns of those 
opposing the transgender plaintiffs in the North Carolina litigation be 
taken into account. Any proposed new configuration must protect the 
privacy, safety, and dignity of every person who enters the space. But 
these concerns can be protected in ways other than by dividing public 
restrooms into binary spaces, men’s and women’s. 
An important analogy can be drawn to the issue of marriage 
equality. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. 
 
 132. See, e.g., Jody L. Herman, Gendered Restrooms and Minority Stress: The Public 
Regulation of Gender and Its Impact on Transgender People’s Lives, 19 J. PUB. MGMT. & SOC. 
POL’Y 65, 75 (2013). In a survey of ninety-three respondents in Washington, D.C., 58% of the 
respondents reported that they “avoided going out in public due to a lack of safe restroom 
facilities,” id. at 76, 68% reported that they had been verbally harassed in a restroom, and 9% 
reported that they had been physically assaulted in a restroom, id. at 71; see also id. at 67 
(documenting previous qualitative studies in this area). 
 133. Lynch, supra note 86. 
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Hodges,134 courts devoted considerable attention to determining the sex 
of a transperson for the purpose of state laws mandating opposite sex 
marriage.135 After the Court concluded that the Constitution requires 
marriage equality,136 the need to determine anyone’s sex for marriage 
purposes evaporated. Similarly, were multi-user public restrooms in the 
future to become all-gender, the central question raised in the North 
Carolina litigation as to whether gender identity or birth certificate sex 
should be the criterion for restroom usage would evaporate. 
Recent developments with respect to all-gender restrooms are 
encouraging. On September 29, 2016, California Governor Jerry Brown 
signed into law legislation that requires all single-user restrooms in 
California to be designated “all-gender.”137 That law states in pertinent 
part: “All single-user toilet facilities in any business establishment, place 
of public accommodation, or state or local government agency shall be 
identified as all-gender toilet facilities . . . .”138 Similar legislation has 
also been adopted by Philadelphia and Seattle,139 among other cities, as 
well as by various universities.140 
In another development receiving less attention, the International 
Code Council (“ICC”) amended the International Plumbing Code in 
2015 to require that single-user toilet facilities no longer be designated 
 
 134. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 135. See, e.g., In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 122–26 (Kan. 2002); M. T. v. J. T., 355 A.2d 204, 
205–07 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976); Littleton v. Prange. 9 S.W.3d 223, 223–27 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1999). 
 136. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602–03. (“The right of same-sex couples to marry that is part 
of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that 
Amendment’s guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 137. A.B. No. 1732, ch. 818, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §	1 (C.A. 2016). 
 138. Id. 
 139. PHILA., PA., EXISTING BUILDING CODE §	9-636(2) (Am. Legal Publ’g Corp. through 
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but not limited to Retail Establishments and City-owned buildings, that currently has or at 
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§§	14.07.010–.040 (Mun. Code Corp. through Feb. 17, 2017); see Phila., Pa., Ordinance 150668 
(Oct. 20, 2015); Phila., Pa., Ordinance 150668 (Oct. 20, 2015); Seattle, Wa., Ordinance 124929 
(Aug. 14, 2015). 
 140. See, e.g., La. State Univ. Student Senate, Resolution 15 (Oct. 2015); see also Bamzi 
Banchiri, Yale OKs Gender-Neutral Bathrooms, Joining 150+ College Trend, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (May 21, 2016), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Education/2016/0521/Yale-OKs-
gender-neutral-bathrooms-joining-150-college-trend [https://perma.cc/C39M-M4RN]; Katy 
Steinmetz, The Gender-Neutral Bathroom Revolution Is Growing, TIME (Jan. 11, 2016), http://
time.com/4175774/san-francisco-gender-neutral-bathrooms/ [https://perma.cc/9DLF-9VEC] 
(noting that other places such as Washington, D.C.; Austin, Texas; and West Hollywood, 
California, have adopted similar measures, along with over 150 colleges and universities in the 
United States). 
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by gender markers.141 The amendment states in pertinent part: “Single-
user toilet facilities and bathing rooms, and family or assisted-use toilet 
and bathing rooms shall be identified for use by either sex.”142 
Despite language that arguably adopts a binary vision of sex 
(“either sex”), the commentary accompanying this amendment makes 
clear that it was meant to take into account the needs of transgender 
people: “The same number of fixtures are provided and waiting can be 
reduced by allowing either sex to use the toilet room. This will also 
addresses the concerns regarding transgender individuals . . . .”143 
This amendment will take effect in 2018.144 Its importance cannot be 
understated. The International Plumbing Code is the model code that 
virtually every municipality in the United States adopts to govern 
building construction.145 Accordingly, as localities choose to update their 
building codes to take account of this ICC amendment, the single-user, 
all-gender public restroom will become commonplace across America. 
But, of course, multi-user and not single-user public restrooms are 
at the heart of the North Carolina controversy. In fact, scholars have 
also begun thinking about new ways to reconfigure multi-user public 
restrooms to take into account the needs of all people for safe and 
accessible restrooms that protect individual privacy. In the book Toilet: 
Public Restrooms and the Politics of Sharing, Harvey Molotch, professor 
in the Department of Sociology and the Department of Social and 
Cultural Analysis at New York University (“NYU”), recounts the failed 
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(2016), http://productionpullzone.umz7izwbxixtqs4tn8wkvgdcktq5y5tafr.netdna-cdn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015-Group-A-Final-Action-OGCV.pdf [https://perma.cc/WP4C-RAHH] 
[hereinafter INT’L CODE COUNCIL, FINAL ACTION RESULTS] (noting adoption of the 
amendment subject to proposed change in Public Comment 2). 
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perma.cc/85SL-TD9J]. 
 145. The International Building Code (which includes the pertinent provisions of the 
International Plumbing Code related to single user restrooms) has been adopted in fifty 
states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, New York City, the U.S. 
Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. Int’l Code Council, Adoptions of the International Codes 
(Jan. 2017) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). 
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attempt at NYU to include an all-gender, multi-user restroom as part of 
a building reconstruction.146 After exploring the forces that doomed the 
endeavor,147 Molotch asks, “What Would a Better Bathroom Look 
Like?”148—leading him to contemplate “the outlines for a utopian vision 
of men and women and people of all sorts sharing toilet space and 
shaping social life.”149 
Molotch sets forth prototypes for both a large-scale multi-user 
restroom and for an office-scale multi-user restroom.150 Though an 
examination of the specifics of his proposals is beyond the scope of this 
Article, suffice it to say that the layouts Molotch proposes are deeply 
sensitive to the needs of all people using public restrooms, needs not 
only of able-bodied, cisgender adults, but also of children, persons with 
disabilities, the aged, parents with children, transgender people, etc. The 
proposed designs enable “people [to] sort themselves out by the 
equipment they need rather than what they putatively are.”151 Molotch 
observes: 
[H]anging a sign on the door does not keep miscreants out. To 
whatever degree gender separation implies a false sense of 
security (and lessens it by lowering the number of people around), 
it blocks the unisex configuration that might alleviate not only the 
criminality problem but the other difficulties as well. Ironically, it 
might be especially useful to avoid gender segregation when men 
dominate in the environment because that is the most likely 
condition when a woman would find herself the only person in the 
women’s room. Maybe imposition of gender segregation, aimed at 
enhancing security, undermines it . . . .152 
Simply put, having more eyes on the street assures everyone of safer 
surroundings. Gender-designated door signs have little effect in 
deterring criminals and sexual predators intent on perpetrating their 
dastardly deeds. 
More recently, architect Joel Sanders and transgender historian 
Susan Stryker have challenged the very assumption that restrooms in 
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public places must be segregated by sex.153 Instead, they advocate for all-
gender, multi-user public restrooms.154 While not ignoring the legitimate 
dangers that people face in public bathrooms,155 they attempt to “get[] 
beyond problematic ideological misconceptions and prejudices that still 
haunt our thinking.”156 Sanders and Stryker argue that achieving this 
goal requires a shift from a narrow focus on gender neutrality to the 
broader goals of gender and human diversity.157 
Their proposed architectural solution would replace the sex-
segregated facility with a public restroom that is configured as a “single 
open space with fully enclosed stalls.”158 Like Molotch, they suggest that 
“by consolidating a greater number of people in one room rather than 
two, the unisex, gender-neutral bathroom provides safety in numbers: 
increasing bathroom occupancy reduces risks of predation associated 
with being alone and out of sight.”159 
CONCLUSION 
The opposing parties in the federal litigation over H.B. 2 have 
arrived at an impasse. On one side are the State plaintiffs and others 
concerned with protecting the privacy, safety, and dignity of the people 
of North Carolina—in particular women and girls—when they enter 
public restrooms. On the other side are organizations and individuals 
concerned that everyone—not just people who fit traditional molds of 
normalcy—has access to safe and accessible public restrooms. Moreover, 
the Trump administration’s recent withdrawal of support for 
transgender students in public restroom cases raises critical questions as 
to whether the federal government has any further interest in supporting 
the rights of transgender people.160 
While the final act of the “morality play” unfolding in North 
Carolina remains uncertain, the underlying conflict exemplifies the 
ongoing national debate over the rights of transgender people.161 These 
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conflicting views can be directly attributed to the unquestioned 
architectural configuration of the sex-separated, multi-user restroom, an 
architectural icon shrouded in cultural understandings and social 
conventions that date back to the late nineteenth century. Those 
understandings and conventions effectively caused the litigants to distort 
the truths about the lives of transgender people, who are still denied safe 
and accessible public restrooms. The time has come to topple the sex-
segregated, multi-user restroom from its pedestaled position in the 
domain of architecture and engage in creative thinking about new ways 
to configure public restrooms that serve the needs of all people. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1205 (2017) 
1240 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
 
 
 
 
